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MONROE-LIVINGSTON SANITARY LANDFILL, INC.
v. TOWN OF CALEDONIA: STATE LANDFILL
REGULATION AND THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE
In recent years, the problem of waste disposal has reached national
proportions.' In response to this growing problem, states, exercising
their police power,2 enacted legislation to lengthen the lifespan of
landfill sites by restricting their use.3 Challenges under the cor-
1. See Note, The Commerce Clause and Interstate Waste Disposal- New Jersey's
Options After the Philadelphia Decision, 11 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 31-34 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Note, New Jersey's Options]; Note, Problems Associated with the Management
of Solid Wastes: Is there a Solution in the Offing?, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 131 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Waste Problems]. The federal government has intervened
with the Solid Waste Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1981).
2. The police power is an incident of state sovereignty. See infra note 75. Under
the police power, the states legislate to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their
citizens. See Note, Waste Embargo Held a Violation of the Commerce Clause, City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, I I CONN. L. REv. 292, 297-98 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Waste Embargo]. For a discussion of the interrelationship of police power and
the commerce clause, see Note, Garbage, The Police Power, and the Commerce Clause:
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 8 CAP. U.L. REV. 613 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Garbage and the Police Power].
3. In 1978, ten states had legislation that banned out-of-state waste. See Com-
ment, State Embargo fSolid Waste Impermissible Isolation or Rational Solution to a
Pressing Problem?, 82 DICK. L. REV. 325, 346-48 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, State Embargo]. Today, only five of those state statutes remain. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 1701 (Supp. 1980) (allows interstate refuse if permit is obtained); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1021 (Smith-Hurd 1981) (allows interstate refuse if it is
deposited at a site meeting statutory requirements); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 2253 (Supp. 1980) (allows interstate refuse if it is used as a raw material in produc-
tion or if the refuse originates from property adjacent to Maine's state border); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 147:30-f to :30-g (Supp. 1979) (allows interstate refuse if it is used
as a raw material in production or if the out-of-state city producing the refuse is a
member of the regional refuse disposal district or has an agreement with a state city to
share facilities); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-10 (West Supp. 1981) (denies entry of inter-
state refuse until state's environmental commissioner promulgates the necessary regu-
lations).
The other five statutes were repealed. Solid waste management acts have been
enacted in their places. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:1124 (West Supp. 1981); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21C, § 5 (West 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018 (Purdon
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merce clause,4 brought by outsiders desiring access to restricted state
landfills, questioned the validity of these state statutes.5 Under stan-
dard commerce clause analysis, the United States Supreme Court has
subjected statutes that facially discriminate against interstate com-
merce to a balancing test,6 invalidating the statute if its discrimina-
tory impact and the existence of adequate nondiscriminatory
alternatives outweigh the resulting local benefits.' In Monroe-Living-
ston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia,8 however, the New
York Court of Appeals held that an ordinance facially prohibiting
disposal within the town of any refuse generated elsewhere did not
violate the commerce clause.9
1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 23-19.1-7 to .1-9 (Supp. 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6604
(Supp. 1981). The Pennsylvania statute is a prime example of these new acts. It au-
thorizes the state's Department of Environmental Resources to administer a solid
waste management plan. This plan includes the issuance of the required permits to
persons desiring to deposit refuse or operate sanitary landfills in the state. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 6018 (Purdon 1981).
In addition to state regulation, the national scope of the waste disposal problem has
led to federal legislation. See Note, Waste Problems, supra note 1, at 138-40 (discus-
sion on the federal Solid Waste Disposal Act). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1981).
4. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have power to regulate Com-
merce among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." Id. The commerce
clause affords constitutional protection only to articles of interstate commerce. The
issue is whether valueless refuse constitutes an article of commerce. Some refuse car-
ries a value based on its potential for recycling or use as fuel. This renewable refuse is
clearly a legitimate article of commerce. Non-renewable refuse has value imputed to
it from the valuable service of its collection and disposal. Non-renewable refuse,
therefore, is also a legitimate article of commerce. See Hackensack Meadowlands
Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68 N.J. 451, 468-69, 348 A.2d
505, 513-14 (1975); Comment, State Embargo, supra note 3, at 333-36.
5. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Note, Waste
Embargo, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). In Hughes, the Court
invalidated a state statute for its discrimination against the interstate commerce of
natural minnows. The statute, "on its face," forbade the transportation of natural
minnows out of the state for commercial purposes. Furthermore, the statute, in its
"effect," prevented natural minnows from entering the interstate market. Id. at 336.
See also Maltz, The Burger Court, The Commerce Clause, and the Problem of Differen-
tial Treatment, 54 IND. L.J. 165 (1979) (discussion of facial and direct discrimination).
7. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 336.
8. 51 N.Y.2d 679, 417 N.E.2d 78, 435 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1980). The issue in Monroe
was whether a facially discriminatory ordinance that did not directly discriminate
against interstate commerce was valid. Id. at 684, 417 N.E.2d at 80, 435 N.Y.S.2d at
968.
9. Id. at 685, 417 N.E.2d at 81, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
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Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill (Monroe) was the only pri-
vately owned and operated landfill in the Town of Caledonia." The
landfill had derived all of its business from communities within the
state and intended to continue doing so.II While Monroe was negoti-
ating a contract to handle a nearby county's refuse, Caledonia en-
acted a sanitary landfill ordinance. 2 The ordinance prohibited the
disposal of any refuse generated outside of Caledonia in the town
landfill. 3 Monroe unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of
the ordinance. 4 On appeal, the Appellate Division held that the or-
dinance facially restricted interstate movement of refuse.' 5 Never-
theless, the ordinance withstood constitutional scrutiny because its
burden upon interstate commerce was negligible.' 6 Furthermore, the
ordinance advanced the city's legitimate interest in protecting the
health of its residents. 7 The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed
the Appellate Division's decision, finding that the ordinance did not
burden interstate commerce. 8 The court reasoned that since Monroe
10. Id.
11. Id. at 684, 417 N.E.2d at 80, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 968. A sample of Monroe's
customers included towns in Monroe, Livingston, and Genesee Counties, the City of
Rochester, and businesses such as Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation. Brief for
Appellant at 68.
12. 51 N.Y.2d at 682, 417 N.E.2d at 79, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 967. The Caledonia
ordinance states that: "Refuse generated outside of the Town of Caledonia, New
York, will not be accepted at facilities licensed by the Town of Caledonia unless au-
thorized by the Town Board and consistent with the regional comprehensive plan as it
relates to solid waste management." Caledonia, N.Y., Sanitary Landfill Ordinance
§ 7, subdiv. C (1976). A business could, however, apply for a special license authoriz-
ing the acceptance of out-of-town refuse. Id.
13. Caledonia, N.Y., Sanitary Landfill Ordinance § 7, subdiv. C (1976).
14. 51 N.Y.2d at 683, 417 N.E.2d at 79-80, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
15. Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 72 A.D.2d
957, 958, 422 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251 (1979).
16. Id. at 958, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
17. Id.
18. Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d at 684-85, 417 N.E.2d at
80-81, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 968-69. The trial court also discussed whether the town ordi-
nance was preempted by the state statute dealing with solid waste disposal. Id. at 683,
417 N.E.2d at 80, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 967-68. It held that the town ordinance was not
preempted because the state statute did not evidence any intent to preempt. Id. at
683-84, 417 N.E.2d at 80, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 967-68. See also Note, Waste Embargo,
supra note 2, at 308 & n.79 (refers to cases and materials that discuss the Supreme
Court's recent reluctance to apply the doctrine of preemption to state statutes). The
court failed to state whether the federal Solid Waste Disposal Act preempted the town
ordinance. See supra note 3.
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never refused out-of-state refuse, no evidence of discrimination ex-
isted.'9 The court further denied the argument that intrastate out-of-
town businesses, depositing refuse at sites outside of Caledonia, but
still within the state, would indirectly displace interstate refuse.20
The Supreme Court promulgated the current majority test for dis-
cerning the effect of state legislation upon interstate commerce in
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission. 21 In Hunt,
a North Carolina statute required either the use of the applicable
USDA grade or no grade at all on closed apple crates shipped for sale
within the state. 2 The statute, on its face, exhibited no discrimina-
tion against interstate commerce.' The Court found, however, that
the statute effected discrimination in its operation. 24 The Court used
a balancing test, which shifted to the statute's proponent the burden
of demonstrating local benefits and the unavailability of adequate
nondiscriminatory alternatives.25
19. Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d at 684, 417 N.E.2d at 80,
435 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
20. Id. at 684-85, 417 N.E.2d at 80-81, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 968. Monroe argued that
these intrastate businesses would dump elsewhere in New York, using landfill space
otherwise available to interstate business. Id. The court overlooked a related argu-
ment--that intrastate out-of-town businesses engaged in interstate commerce would
also be displaced. See supra note 10.
21. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
22. Id. at 335.
23. Id. at 352. "Discrimination" against interstate commerce is commonly de-
fined as state regulation that substantially affects interstate commerce with no similar
effects on intrastate commerce. Note, Solving New Jersey's Solid Waste Problem Con-
stitutionaisy--or-Filling the Great Silences with Garbage, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 741,
746 n.33 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, New Jerseyr Problem]. The text of the
statute, "on its face," gave no indication of discrimination. See supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
24. 432 U.S. at 350-52. Washington apple growers marketed their product under
their state's grading system, a more rigid system than the USDA applies. The North
Carolina requirement increased the Washington growers' business expenses and cut
the competitive advantage attributable to their popular apples. The statute did not
affect similar North Carolina growers. Id. at 336-37, 351. Thus, the statute caused
direct discrimination against interstate commerce. Id.
25. Id. at 353. "When discrimination against commerce. . . is demonstrated, the
burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from
the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to pre-
serve the local interests at stake." Id.
The Hunt balancing test must be reviewed in light of an earlier test presented in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be up-
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The "per se" rule, a novel shortcut used to avoid the Hunt test,
held unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits. . . . If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be toler-
ated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id. at 142. A "burden on interstate commerce" is defined as excessive state regulation
that affects intrastate and interstate commerce indiscriminately. Note, New Jersey's
Problem, supra note 23. The Pike test, unlike the Hunt test, cannot be used to review
a discriminatory statute.
The development of the Pike test began in Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
761 (1945). In Southern Pacofc, the Supreme Court held that the safety effect of a
state law prohibiting the operation of trains with over 14 passengers or 70 cars was so
"slight or problematical as not to outweigh the burden on interstate commerce." Id.
at 775. See also G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
285-86 (10th ed. 1980); Comment, Use of the Commerce Clause to Invalidate Anti-
Phosphate Legislation: Will It Wash?, 45 U. COLO. L. REv. 487, 492, 493 n.50 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Will It Wash?]. The Supreme Court again utilized a
balancing approach in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). In
Bibb, the utilization of the Southern Pacqfc test invalidated a state safety statute re-
quiring trucks and trailers on the state's highways to use special mudflaps. Id. at 522,
530.
In Pike, the balancing test achieved its present form. The Pike Court invalidated a
state statute requiring all locally grown cantaloupes to be crated before shipment. 397
U.S. at 145-46.
The Pike test survived an attack in Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S.
429 (1978). In Raymond Motor, the Court held that, regardless of precedent prior to
Southern Pacofc and Bibb, the state statute prohibiting double-trailers over 55 feet
long posed a substantial burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 442-48. For further
analysis of the development of the Pike test, see Maltz, The Burger Court, The Regula-
tion of Interstate Transportation, and the Concept of Local Concern: The Jurisprudence
of Categories, 46 TENN. L. REV. 406 (1979); Comment, State Embargo, supra note 3,
at 336-45. But see Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (a state
may exercise the right to favor its own citizens by requiring out-of-state residents to
present stricter proof of original state titleship of junk automobiles delivered for de-
struction).
Some commentators have urged that the Pike balancing test be abandoned or al-
tered. D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: FEDERAL AND STATE 290-94 (1974).
For further discussion of the Pike test, see Comment, Will It Wash?, supra, at 489-94.
The rationale for this dissatisfaction lies in its balancing of the burdens upon com-
merce against the effectiveness of the means for reaching the legitimate end. Id. at
290. Improper balancing may lead to usurpation of the state legislative role in poli-
cymaking. Id. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman & Engineman v. Chi-
cago, R.I. & P.R.R., 393 U.S. 129, 136 (1968) (reversed district court, which had
engaged in the prohibited "legislative" role of determining that "full-crew" laws did
not substantially affect safety in train operations). See generally Comment, Will It
Wash?, supra, at 489-94.
The precursors to the Hunt test deviated from the Pike rationale in Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935). In Baldwin, the Supreme Court, hinting at a bal-
ancing test, held that the "relation between [a state statute prohibiting the sale of
1983]
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arose in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.26 In Philadelphia, the
New Jersey Waste Control Act prohibited any person from bringing
refuse into the state if it originated elsewhere.27 Private landfill own-
ers in New Jersey, and their municipal patrons in other states, chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the state statute on commerce clause
interstate milk and the objective of protecting public health] was too remote and indi-
rect to justify the obstructions to interstate commerce." Id. at 524. A preliminary
balancing test arose in Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). In Dean
Milk, the Supreme Court held that a city ordinance, prohibiting the sale of milk bot-
tled more than five miles from the center of the city, discriminated against interstate
commerce. Id. at 350, 356. Under the Dean Milk analysis, a discriminatory effect of
an ordinance could be justified in terms of the local interests and the available meth-
ods to effectuate them. Id. at 354. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S.
366 (1976) (invalidated a state statute denying the sale of milk by out-of-state produ-
cers whose own states failed to sign reciprocity agreements).
In Hunt, the Court matured the test of Dean Milk. There, the proponents failed to
justify the statute's direct discrimination, due to the artless disclosure of an illegiti-
mate motive and the existence of available alternatives. 432 U.S. at 352-54.
26. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
27. Id. at 618-19. The New Jersey Waste Control Act, enacted the 1973, read as
follows:
No person shall bring into this State any solid or liquid waste which originated
or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State, except garbage to be fed
to swine in the State of New Jersey, until the Commissioner [of the State Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection] shall determine that such action can be per-
mitted without endangering the public health, safety and welfare and has
promulgated regulations permitting and regulating the treatment and disposal of
such waste in this State. Any person violating this provision shall be subject to
the penalty and enforcement provisions of the "Waste Control Act."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1-10 (West Supp. 1981). The statute was repealed in 1981.
1981 NJ. Laws, ch. 78, § 1. Regulations, promulgated by the commissioner, became
effective February 1, 1974.
a) No person shall bring into this State, or accept for disposal in this State,
any solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial
limits of this State. This Section shall not apply to:
1. Garbage to be fed to swine in the State of New Jersey;
2. Any separated waste material, including newsprint, paper, glass and met-
als, that is free from putrescible materials and not mixed with other solid or
liquid waste;
3. Municipal solid waste to be separated or processed into usable secondary
materials, including fuel and heat, at a resource recovery facility provided that
no less than 70 per cent of the thru-put of any such facility is to be separated or
processed into usable secondary materials; and
4. Pesticides, hazardous waste, chemical waste, bulk liquid, bulk semi-liquid
which is to be treated, processed or recovered in a solid waste disposal facility
which is registered with the Department of such treatment, processing or recov-
ery, other than by disposal on or in the lands of this State.
NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 1-4.2 (Supp. 1977).
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grounds.28 To fulfill the Hunt requirements, the state presented evi-
dence of health-related objectives.2 9 These objectives, however,
merely hid efforts to isolate the state landfill resources from out-of-
state residents.30 To forge an alternative to the Hunt test, the Court
stated that economic protectionism3 can exist either in a statute's
means or in its objectives.32 Finding economic protectionism in the
attempted means, 33 the Philadelphia Court held that the statute was
28. 437 U.S. at 619. The New Jersey operators had waste disposal agreements
with the out-of-state cities. The statute immediately affected the operators' businesses
and the cities' waste removal service. In response, they sued the State of New Jersey
and its Department of Environmental Protection. Id.
29. Id. at 625-26. The determination of legitimacy regressed into a "yelling con-
test" with the plaintiff shouting "economic end" and the defendant screaming
"health." Id.
30. See id. at 626.
31. Economic protectionism results when a state uses its police powers to isolate
its residents from adverse competition with other states' residents. See, e.g., H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-39 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. See-
lig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1938). Under the Articles of Confederation, economic
exclusionary actions led to counteractions threatening fragmentation of the nation.
See THE FEDERALIST 26-30 (J. Hamilton ed. 1869). The constitutional authors
sought to reduce this destructive effect of economic protectionism on the flow of inter-
state commerce. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 U.S. at 533-35; Baldwin, 294
U.S. at 521-23. But see Note, Garbage and the Police Power, supra note 2, at 623-28
(the commerce clause does not guarantee that one state may use another as a landfill,
because such action would be counterproductive and met with retaliatory dumping).
32. 437 U.S. at 626. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. at 354 (discrimina-
tory means prohibited the sale of non-local milk in order to regulate the sanitary
standard of milk sold).
The Philadelphia Court cited a line of cases challenging protectionism statutes
whose legitimate goals failed to deter the Court's finding of discriminatory means.
437 U.S. at 427. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (a discrimi-
natory statute sought to maintain an adequate supply of milk by creating price floors
against undercutting interstate competition); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel,
278 U.S. 1 (1928) (a discriminatory statute sought to increase the quantity of indus-
trial jobs in the state by preventing the shipment out of state of unshelled shrimp for
packaging). These cases demonstrate that an economic motive may be as legitimate
as a police power motive, so long as it is not effectuated by discriminatory means. 437
U.S. at 626-27. But see Note, Garbage and the Police Power, supra note 2, at 623-25
(criticizes the Philadelphia Court's failure to consider the alleged legitimate local
interest).
33. 437 U.S. at 627. The only reason for using this discriminatory means rested in
preserving the state landfills for residential use only. Id. at 626-27, 629. Nonresident
refuse does not constitute a greater health hazard than resident refuse. Id. at 629. If
the problem lies in the increasing volume of refuse deposited in New Jersey's limited
landfill space, then a more direct and nondiscriminatory approach would be to limit
1983]
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invalid per se under the commerce clause.34
Dutchess Sanitation Service, Inc. v. Town of Plattekill35 presented a
the quantity of refuse that could be deposited by everyone, regardless of residential
status. Id. at 626-27.
34. See 437 U.S. at 624, 627-28. The Hunt test requires balancing when prima
facie discrimination is found. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n,
432 U.S. at 353. The Supreme Court, however, in applying a per se rule of invalidity,
sidesteps this part of the analysis. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at
624. See also infra note 68 and accompanying text (discussion of the Monroe Court's
failure to apply correctly the Hunt test). The Supreme Court has frequently heard
commerce clause challenges against economic protectionism statutes. These cases
have consistently tipped toward invalidity, virtually forming a per se rule of invalid-
ity. See City ofPhiladelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. See also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970) (declared a state statute that requires the packaging of cantaloupe in
the state before interstate shipment to be virtually invalid per se); H.P. Hood & Sons,
Inc., v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (invalidated a state statute that avowedly de-
nied construction of an additional milk plant by an interstate business because the
plant would create destructive competition in an adequately served local market);
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (invalidated a state statute prohib-
iting, in effect, the sale of interstate milk at less than intrastate prices); Foster-Foun-
tain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (invalidated a state statute preventing
the packing of unshelled shrimp out of the state because of the local demand for shell
products).
The Court has not promulgated this rule indiscriminately. The rule only applies
when statutes effectuate simple economic protectionism. City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624. "Simple economic protectionism" exists when legitimate state
interests do not support the statute or there is patent discrimination against interstate
commerce. Id. When the statute does not effectuate "simple economic protection-
ism," the Hunt balancing test is used. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353.
Some commentators criticize the use of the "artificial" per se rule of invalidity.
They present alternative reasons for holding the statutes invalid. Dister & Schles-
inger, State Waste Embargoes Violate the Commerce Clause: City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 371, 377-83, 389, 391 (1979). Other commentators con-
sider the absence of the balancing step to be an anomaly in commerce clause analysis.
Note, Garbage and the Police Power, supra note 2, at 626-27, 629.
35. 51 N.Y.2d 670, 417 N.E.2d 74, 435 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1980). In the interim be-
tween Philadelphia and Dutchess, the Court rearticulated the Pike and Hunt tests in
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
[W]e must inquire (1) whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly
with only "incidental" effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against
interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect; (2) whether the statute
serves a legitimate local purpose; and, if so, (3) whether alternative means could
promote this local purpose as well without discriminating against interstate com-
merce. The burden to show discrimination rests on the party challenging the
validity of the statute, but "[w]hen discrimination against commerce ...is
demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of the local
benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory al-
ternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake."
Id. at 336 (invalidated a state statute prohibiting the transportation of natural min-
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similar commerce clause analysis problem. Here, however, the New
York court avoided the Supreme Court rule of invalidity per se.3 6 In
Dutchess, a town ordinance 37 prohibited everyone except town resi-
dents and business owners from depositing refuse that originated
outside the town.38 The plaintiff was a town landfill business, dealing
in interstate refuse with out-of-state customers.39 The court, noting
that purely local activities may substantially affect interstate com-
merce,4 0 applied the "ripple effect" test, focusing upon the "imposi-
nows out of the state for commercial purposes). Hughes required that a statute, dis-
criminating against interstate commerce solely on its face, must withstand the scrutiny
of the Hunt test. Id. at 337. See Dister & Schlesinger, supra note 34, at 384, 390.
36. See 51 N.Y.2d at 677, 417 N.E.2d at 78, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 965-66 (used the
Hunt balancing test). Apparently, the court did not find "simple economic protec-
tionism" in Dutchess. Because legitimate local interests support the ordinance, there
is no patent discrimination against interstate commerce. 51 N.Y.2d at 677, 417
N.E.2d at 78, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 966. See supra note 33. The factual situations in Phila-
delphia and Dutchess are too similar, however, to support such opposing views of the
per se rule. Another reason for the court to use the balancing test might have been the
fear of being overruled by the Supreme Court. "Simple economic protectionism" is
more apparent in a state statute than in a town ordinance. Upon review, therefore,
the Court could have found a misapplication of that standard. A more likely reason
is that the Dutchess Court wanted to form a precedent in which stark economic pro-
tectionism was not required for a holding of invalidity. Instead, the Dutchess Court
wanted to ensure that future refuse disposal ordinances, exhibiting no "simple eco-
nomic protectionism" would not be presumed valid, but would be subjected to scru-
tiny under the balancing test. 51 N.Y.2d at 677, 417 N.E.2d at 78, 435 N.Y.S.2d at
966. Cf. infra note 46.
37. See 51 N.Y.2d at 676 n.2, 417 N.E.2d at 77 n.2, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 965 n.2.
38. Id. at 672, 417 N.E.2d at 75, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 963. The ordinance "forbids
anyone other than those who reside or conduct an established business in the town
from depositing within its boundaries any 'garbage, rubbish or other articles originat-
ing elsewhere than in the Town."' Id. The plaintiff could deposit its own trash in the
town, but it could not allow its customers to do likewise. Id.
39. Id. at 672-73, 417 N.E.2d at 75-76, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
40. 51 N.Y.2d at 675-76, 417 N.E.2d at 77, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 964-65. See also Fry
v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975) (wage increases of employees of entirely
intrastate operations substantially affected interstate commerce); United States v. Wo-
men's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 335 U.S. 460, 464 (1949) (a local trade association's
practice of fixing prices for services performed entirely intrastate substantially af-
fected interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125-27 (1942) (wheat,
home-grown for consumption on the farm, substantially affected interstate com-
merce). In Woman's Sportswear, Justice Jackson clarified the issue, indicating that
the "source . . .or . . .the application of the restraint may be intrastate . . . but
neither matters if the necessary effect is to stifle or restrain commerce among the
states. If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the
operation which applies the squeeze." 353 U.S. at 464. Cf. United States v. Rock
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tion of cumulative burdens."4 1 Under this test, the court considers the
extent to which the ordinance at issue, and hypothetically similar or-
dinances, would affect interstate commerce. 42 Here, the court found
that but for the purely local ordinance, or a similar ordinance else-
where, landfill operators such as Dutchess could receive waste from
out-of-state as well as out-of-town. 43 Applying the Hunt balancing
test, the New York court found that the ordinance substantially af-
fected interstate commerce, and that adequate nondiscriminatory
means were available to meet the legitimate end.44 The court there-
fore held the ordinance invalid as discriminatory against interstate
commerce. 45 Furthermore, a minority of the judges viewed the ordi-
Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 569 (1939) (intrastate activities do not escape com-
merce clause analysis merely because they are intrastate).
41. See, e.g., Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d at 684-87, 417
N.E.2d at 80-82, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 968-70; Dutchess Sanitation Sery., Inc., 51 N.Y.2d at
675-76, 417 N.E.2d at 77, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 964-65 (dicta); Fry v. United States, 421
U.S. 542, 547 (1975); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
42. See, e.g., Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d at 684-87, 417
N.E.2d at 80-82, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 968-70 (majority and dissenting opinions); Dutchess
Sanitation Serv., Inc., 51 N.Y.2d at 675-76, 417 N.E.2d at 77, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 964-65
(dicta); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547-48 (1975) (the cumulative burden of
wage increases for entirely local employees would force the wages of interstate em-
ployees to rise and impair federal efforts to stabilize wages); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (where the cumulative burden of homegrown wheat would
have a detrimental effect on federal efforts to stabilize the price and supply of wheat);
Brief for Appellant, supra note 11, at 65-69. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TIJTIONAL LAW 236-37 (1978).
The test does not require that similar activity actually exist in other municipalities.
The courts consider only "the cumulative burden that would result if similar regula-
tions were adopted elsewhere." Dutchess Sanitation Serv., Inc., 51 N.Y.2d at 676, 417
N.E.2d at 77, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 965. See Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc., 51
N.Y.2d at 686-87, 417 N.E.2d at 82, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 969-70; Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 128 (1942). In Wickard, the excess homegrown wheat of only one farmer
was at issue. The trivial effect of this wheat on interstate commerce was sufficient to
produce a "ripple effect," thus activating the commerce clause. Id. Contra, Brief for
Respondent at 59-60, (burdens of similar town ordinances would be mere
speculation).
43. 51 N.Y.2d at 676, 417 N.E.2d at 77, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
44. 51 N.Y.2d at 677, 417 N.E.2d at 78, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 965-66. The court, with-
out debate, accepted health as the only legitimate goal. The court found that this goal
would be achieved more efficiently by the alternatives-inspection and evenhanded
regulation of refuse disposal. No reason exists focusing the discriminatory ordinance
except isolating, by economic means, the town residents from out-of-town demand for
the use of their landfills. Id.
45. Id.
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nance as facially discriminatory.4 6
Although Monroe presented a factual situation virtually identical
to Philadelphia and Dutchess, the Monroe court held contrary to
those cases.47 Although the ordinance in Monroe excluded all refuse
generated outside of Caledonia,4" the majority denied that the ordi-
nance was intended to exclude interstate refuse.4 9
Under the Philadelphia and the Dutchess minority view, the
Monroe majority"0 erred in not finding that the ordinance facially
discriminated against interstate commerce. In Philadelphia, the
Supreme Court held a similar statute, prohibiting all waste originat-
ing or collected outside the state, to be facially discriminatory.5 Ad-
ditionally, in Dutchess, a minority found the ordinance, prohibiting
deposits by anyone other than town residents and business operators,
to be facially discriminatory.52 Likewise, the Monroe ordinance pro-
hibited out-of-town refuse, a category that includes refuse originating
out-of-state.53  Therefore, the ordinance effectively prevented
46. 51 N.Y.2d at 678 n.3, 417 N.E.2d at 78 n.3, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 966 n.3. The three
judges were Fuchsberg, Jones, and Meyer. Id. Judge Fuchsberg authored the unani-
mous opinion in Dutchess. 51 N.Y.2d at 672, 417 N.E.2d at 75, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
In Monroe, however, the court split. Judges Cooke, Jasen, and Gabrielli concurred
with Judge Wachtler in his majority opinion validating the ordinance, and Judge
Jones and Meyer joined with Judge Fuchsberg in his dissenting opinion. 51 N.Y.2d
at 690-91, 417 N.E.2d at 84, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
47. 51 N.Y.2d 679, 417 N.E.2d 78, 435 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1980).
48. Id. at 682-83, 417 N.E.2d at 79, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
49. Id. at 684, 417 N.E.2d at 80, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 968. The facts suggest that the
ordinance was merely the town's response to prevent entry of refuse from a nearby
county. Id. at 688, 417 N.E.2d at 82, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 970 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting);
Brief for Appellant, supra note 11, at 73-74.
50. The Monroe dissent viewed the ordinance as facially discriminatory. 51
N.Y.2d at 685, 691, 417 N.E.2d at 81, 84, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 969, 972 (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting). See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
51. 437 U.S. at 618, 627-28.
52. 51 N.Y.2d at 678 n.3,417 N.E.2d at 78 n.3,435 N.Y.S.2d at 966 n.3. See supra
note 46.
53. 51 N.Y.2d at 685, 417 N.E.2d at 81, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 969 (Fuchsberg, J., dis-
senting); Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 72 A.D.2d
957, 958, 422 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251 (1979) (the lower court admitted that the ordinance
"theoretically" restricts interstate commerce). Cf. Dutchess Sanitation Serv., Inc., 51
N.Y.2d at 678 n.3, 417 N.E.2d at 78 n.3, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 966 n.3 (three of the seven
judges held an ordinance virtually identical to that in Monroe to be facially
discriminatory).
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Monroe from contracting with out-of-state firms.54 It also denied use
of the town's landfill to outlying businesses that affect or engage in
interstate commerce. 55 The Monroe majority erred, therefore, in fail-
ing to consider this facial discrimination.
The Monroe majority also erred by not finding that the ordinance,
as applied, discriminated against interstate commerce. The Monroe
majority determined that the plaintiff did not actually engage in in-
terstate commerce.56 It based this assertion upon the plaintiffs ad-
mission that it had never contracted for out-of-state refuse and that it
did not anticipate such business.57 The majority, using only this ad-
mission, distinguished Philadelphia and Dutchess,51 because both
prior cases contained evidence of ongoing interstate business.5 9
Thus, in Philadelphia and in Dutchess, discrimination was actual and
apparent.60
The Monroe majority astutely noted that no out-of-state carting
firms6' were denied access to Caledonia's landfills by the ordinance.62
The court dismissed, however, the indirect effect caused by the re-
fusal of access to intrastate businesses. 63 These companies either en-
54. See 51 N.Y.2d at 686, 417 N.E.2d at 82, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 969 (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting).
55. Id.
56. 51 N.Y.2d at 684, 685, 417 N.E.2d at 80, 81, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 968, 969.
57. Id. at 684, 417 N.E.2d at 80, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
58. Id. at 684, 685, 417 N.E.2d at 80, 81, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 968, 969.
59. Id. at 684, 417 N.E.2d at 80, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 968. The majority looked for
ongoing interstate activity at the time the ordinance was enacted. Id. The time of
enactment cannot be the sole time used for determining whether actual interstate ac-
tivity is occurring. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. If an out-of-state
business offer were made to plaintiff, only the resulting actual discrimination would
cause the ordinance to become fallible. See 51 N.Y.2d 679, 417 N.E.2d 78, 435
N.Y.S.2d 966 (1980).
The other distinguishing factor is that a state statute was involved in Philadelphia,
while a town ordinance was involved in Monroe. This difference is minimal, how-
ever, because Dutchess also involved a town ordinance. See supra note 38.
60. 51 N.Y.2d at 677, 417 N.E.2d at 78, 80, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 966, 968.
61. "Carting firms" are businesses that transport refuse. RANDOM HousE COL-
LEGE DICTIONARY 207 (rev. 1975).
62. 51 N.Y.2d at 684-85, 417 N.E.2d at 80-81, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 968-69.
63. Id. at 684-85, 417 N.E.2d at 80-81, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 968-69. The majority says
that few such ordinances enacted in the development of a community would be valid
under such a view. Id. The example given is a zoning ordinance that lowers the
number of houses constructed in a certain sector of the community. The dissent sug-
gests that this example does not support the majority's argument. The fewer number
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol24/iss1/11
STATE LANDFILL REGULATION
gaged in interstate commerce or competed with interstate businesses
for other landfill space.' By rejecting any claim of indirect effect, the
court ignored compelling precedents, which established that purely
local activities may substantially deter interstate commerce by a "rip-
ple effect."6 Undoubtedly, the denial of access to these intrastate
businesses, and other similarly situated businesses, would have a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.66
Because it failed to find that the ordinance facially and directly
discriminated against interstate commerce, the Monroe majority
never reached the final step in the analysis-the Hunt balancing
test.6 7 When an ordinance discriminates against interstate com-
merce, 68 its proponents must show, under Hunt, the unavailability of
adequate nondiscriminatory alternatives and that the local benefits
of houses constructed would lessen the amount of building materials moving through
interstate commerce to the community. The lessening of the demand, however, would
be equal across the board and would not discriminate against interstate commerce.
Id. at 685-86 & n.l, 417 N.E.2d at 81 & n.l, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 968-69 & n.l (Fuchsberg,
J., dissenting).
The Monroe court distinguished the dicta in Dutchess. See infra note 40. Appar-
ently, judging from the numerous references in his dissent in Monroe to his dicta in
Dutchess, Judge Fuchsberg prepared the opinion in Dutchess to support his dissent in
Monroe. See 41 N.Y.2d at 685-91, 417 N.E.2d at 81-84, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 969-72
(Fuchsberg, J., dissenting); Dutchess Sanitation Service, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d at 673-78, 417
N.E.2d at 76-78, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 963-66.
64. 51 N.Y.2d at 686, 417 N.E.2d at 81-82, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 969. See supra note
10.
65. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
66. See Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d at 686-87, 417
N.E.2d at 81-82, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 969-70 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
67. See supra note 25.
68. Neither the Dutchess nor Monroe courts dealt with an issue raised by the
Dutchess lower court-whether the commerce clause prohibited a local town ordi-
nance that evenhandedly burdened both intrastate out-of-town businesses and out-of-
state businesses to the advantage of the town. Dutchess Sanitation Serv., Inc. v. Town
of Plattekill, 73 A.D.2d 300, 302, 426 N.Y.S.2d 176, 178 (1980). See Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Justice Relnquist addressed this issue in his dis-
sent in Hughes. In Hughes, the state statute prohibited the transportation of natural
minnows out of the state for commercial purposes. Justice Rehnquist found that the
statute did not discriminate against interstate commerce. He held that it was an even-
handed ban on all persons, residents or not, with only incidental burdens on interstate
commerce. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 344-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See
Note, Hughes v. Oklahoma and Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission" The Com-
merce Clause and State Control of Natural Resources, 66 VA. L. REv. 1145, 1151-52
(1980) (short discussion of Rehnquist's dissent). Contra, Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,
340 U.S. 349, 354 n.4 (1951). The Dean Court invalidated an ordinance prohibiting
the city sale of milk bottled more than five miles from the center of the city. The
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outweigh the discrimination.69 In Monroe, adequate nondiscrimina-
tory alternatives existed, such as limitation on the amount, type, or
state of refuse accepted.7" Moreover, evidence did not support the
alleged local benefit-the preservation of the water supply from con-
tamination.7 Thus, the majority erred in not finding the ordinance
discriminatory either facially or as applied.
The Monroe decision may allow ordinances to discriminate against
interstate commerce, so long as they do not do so directly. Fortu-
nately, this state court decision should only have a limited effect on
the future of waste disposal legislation in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Philadeohia.72 Should Monroe, or a similar
case,73 come before the Supreme Court,74 however, it might be up-
Court considered it immaterial that the statute burdened intrastate commerce outside
the five-mile radius as well as interstate commerce).
69. Monroe-Livingston Sanitary LandfillInc., 51 N.Y.2d at 688, 417 N.E.2d at 83,
435 N.Y.S.2d at 977 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332,
336 (1979).
70. See, e.g., Dutchess Sanitation Serv. Inc., 51 N.Y.2d at 677, 417 N.E.2d at 78,
435 N.Y.S.2d at 965-66. In addition, the town could have authorized its officials or
the State Department of Environmental Protection to administer the ordinance and to
inspect the refuse of depositors for compliance with the ordinance. Id. See supra
note 2.
The majority did not consider either of these alternatives. Monroe-Livingston Sani-
tary Landfll Inc., 51 N.Y.2d at 689, 417 N.E.2d at 83, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 971 (Fuchs-
berg, J., dissenting). The balancing element of the Hughes test only applies when
discrimination is found. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 336 (1979). The major-
ity failed to find discrimination. See Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill Inc., 51
N.Y.2d at 684-85, 417 N.E.2d at 80-81, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 968-69.
71. Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill Inc., 51 N.Y.2d at 689-90, 417 N.E.2d at
83-84, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 971-72 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). Note that after the finding
of discrimination, the burden swings to the defendant town to prove the efficacy of the
ordinance. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 336 (1979). The two authors of
the reports and documents showing danger to the water supply were impeached by
their lack of expertise and absence of actual in-the-field observation. Additionally, no
evidence was presented that showed the finding of pollution in any area well.
Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill Inc., 51 N.Y.2d at 689, 417 N.E.2d at 83, 435
N.Y.S.2d at 971 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
72. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). State court deci-
sions are not binding on federal courts or sister states. In addition, Monroe may be
distinguished because of its uncommon factual situation and lack of direct discrimi-
nation. See Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 51
N.Y.2d 679, 417 N.E.2d 78, 435 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1980).
73. See supra note 3. In addition to the five state statutes, innumerable ordi-
nances, like the Caledonia ordinance, exist. In order for municipalities to judge the
validity of the various legislation, a final decision on the Monroe holding is needed.
74. Monroe has not been appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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held in order to promote state sovereignty. 75  Furthermore, the
Supreme Court that heard Philadelphia has changed due to retire-
ment. Should the opportunity occur, the present Court ought to limit
Monroe to its factual setting, ensuring under Philadelphia and Hunt
that future waste disposal legislation does not discriminate against
interstate commerce.
Kathryn J Wysack
Instead, plaintiff filed an application with the Town of Caledonia (see supra note 13)
for a license to accept refuse from out of town. Caledonia denied the license, and
plaintiff filed for a review of the denial pursuant to Article 78 of the New York Civil
Practice and Rules. Letter from Robert G. Harvey, counsel for Monroe, to Kathryn
J. Wysack (Sept. 4, 1981) (discussing status of Monroe). If the plaintiff had appealed
to the Supreme Court, it would have risked dismissal for lack of injury. No actual
discrimination against interstate commerce had been found by the lower courts. In
following the procedural remedies of the ordinance and of New York law, however,
Monroe has established injury. It has been denied a license to accept refuse from out
of town. Monroe may appeal directly to the Supreme Court, or it may proceed
through the federal courts.
75. Note, Waste Embargo, supra note 2, at 309. "State sovereignty" denotes the
powers reserved by the states in the tenth amendment. Within it, states may perform
essential governmental functions. Note, New Jersey's Problem, supra note 23 at 759-
62. State sovereignty may provide the doctrine under which Monroe or a similar case
is upheld by the Supreme Court. Note, Waste Embargo, supra note 2, at 309.
Other exceptions to the reach of the commerce clause are the ownership exception
and the proprietary exclusion. For a discussion of these exceptions and cases sug-
gesting how a town waste disposal ordinance might bypass commerce clause analysis,
see Note, New Jersey's Problem, supra note 23, at 748-58; 13 GA. L. REv. 1086 (1979).
See also D. ENGDAHL, supra note 25.
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